Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment

Frans van Dijk, Joep Sonnemans () and Frans van Winden ()

No 272, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects. Payment based on individual, team an d relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions.

Keywords: Payment schemes; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive systems in a real effort experiment (2001)
Working Paper: Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_272

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