Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment

Frans van Dijk, Joep Sonnemans () and Frans van Winden ()
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Frans van Dijk: CREED, University of Amsterdam

No 98-023/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on theirincentive effects. Payment based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions.

This discussion paper has led to a publication in the European Economic Review 2001, 45(2), 187-214.

Keywords: Payment schemes; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive systems in a real effort experiment (2001)
Working Paper: Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:19980023

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