Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups

Tamar Kugler, Edgar Kausel and Martin Kocher

No 3701, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area.

Keywords: group decision making; interactive decision making; rationality; discontinuity effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (149)

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Working Paper: Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups (2012)
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