Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?

Margaretha Buurman, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur and Seth Van den Bossche

No 3851, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Further, our results suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute enough to society at work for too little pay.

Keywords: public service motivation; risk aversion; revealed preferences data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 J45 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (95)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public sector employees: Risk averse and altruistic? (2012)
Working Paper: Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic? (2009)
Working Paper: Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3851

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