Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection
Ferdinand von Siemens and
Michael Kosfeld ()
No 4638, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and therefore on their colleagues’ productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers’ indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence.
Keywords: team production; competition; adverse selection; externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D24 J30 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection (2014)
Working Paper: Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4638
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