Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights

Randolph Sloof and Ferdinand von Siemens

No 5509, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Organizations must not only take the right decisions, they must also ensure that these decisions are effectively implemented. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that the same members of many organization are often responsible for both decision initiation and implementation. If these have social preferences, they might thus sabotage both project choices and implementation to express their discontent with the allocation of decision rights. How decisions come about also affects implementation if workers have reciprocal fairness concerns. Our experimental evidence demonstrates that the possibility to sabotage implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that the allocation of authority as such affects implementation.

Keywords: delegation; implementation; procedural preferences; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D23 D86 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5509

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