Projective Paternalism

Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim and Axel Ockenfels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sandro Ambühl

No 7762, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs’ motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others’ choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.

Keywords: paternalism; libertarianism; welfare economics; experiment; false consensus bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D04 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Projective Paternalism (2019)
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