Projective Paternalism

Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim and Axel Ockenfels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sandro Ambühl

No 26119, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs' motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others' choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.

JEL-codes: P43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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