The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks
David Schindler (),
Simeon Andreas Dermot Schudy and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simeon Schudy ()
No 9189, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a natural field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams’ outcomes without crowding out teams’ willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.
Keywords: team-work; tournaments; rankings; incentives; identity; image concerns; innovation; exploration; natural field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D90 J24 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-spo
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Working Paper: The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9189
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