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Sales Performance and Social Preferences

Andrea Essl, Michael Kosfeld (), Markus Kröll and Frauke Von Bieberstein

No 12904, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fraction reveals self-regarding behavior. Matching individual behavior in the game with firm data on sales performance shows that higher concern for others is significantly associated with higher revenue per customer. At the same time, it is also associated with fewer sales per day. Both effects offset each other, so that the overall association with total sales revenue becomes insignificant. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of self- vs. other-regarding concerns in sales contexts with important implications for management and marketing research.

Keywords: experimental games; other-regarding preferences; sales performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-exp
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