Sales Performance and Social Preferences

Andrea Essl (), Frauke von Bieberstein (), Michael Kosfeld and Markus Kröll ()
Additional contact information
Andrea Essl: University of Bern
Frauke von Bieberstein: University of Bern

No 11505, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in otherregarding preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fraction reveals self-regarding behavior. Matching individual behavior in the game with firm data on sales performance shows that higher concern for others is significantly associated with higher revenue per customer. At the same time, it is also associated with fewer sales per day. Both effects offset each other, so that the overall association with total sales revenue becomes insignificant. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of self- vs. other-regarding concerns in sales contexts with important implications for management and marketing research.

Keywords: sales performance; other-regarding preferences; experimental games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Journals of Economics & Management Strategy, 2023, 32 (4), 882-905

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Working Paper: Sales Performance and Social Preferences (2018)
Working Paper: Sales Performance and Social Preferences (2018)
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