Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

Güell, Maia, Caterina Calsamiglia and Chao Fu

No 12958, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using adminis- trative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.

Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12958 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. its Alternatives (2016)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2015)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12958

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12958

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().