Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

Caterina Calsamglia, Chao Fu and Maia Güell ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Caterina Calsamiglia

No 24588, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.

JEL-codes: I0 J0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
Note: ED LS PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2020. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(2), pages 642-680.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24588.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. its Alternatives (2016)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2015)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24588

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24588

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().