Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire

Roman Inderst

No 13711, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study strategic communication between a customer and an advisor who is privately informed about the best suitable choice for the customer, but whose preferences are misaligned with the customer’s preferences. The advisor sends a message to the customer who, in turn, can secure herself from bad advice by acquiring costly information on her own. We find that making the customer’s information acquisition less costly, e.g., through consumer protection regulation or digital information aggregation and dissemination, leads to less prosocial behavior of the advisor. This can be explained by a model of shared guilt, which predicts a shift in causal attribution of guilt from the advisor to the customer if the latter could have avoided her ex post disappointment.

Keywords: Shared guilt; Trust; Guilt aversion; Responsibility diffusion; Advice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-ict, nep-pay and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire (2019)
Working Paper: Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire (2017)
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