Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire

Roman Inderst, Kiryl Khalmetski and Axel Ockenfels

No 90, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide laboratory evidence that the attribution of guilt for disappointed trust is shared between the players whose choices eventually contributed to this disappointment (including the disappointed player herself). We refer to this as "shared guilt" and present a model that captures the phenomenon, and which is consistent with various previous findings. We also discuss potential policy implications.

Keywords: Shared guilt; trust; guilt aversion; responsibility diffusion; financial advice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire (2019)
Working Paper: Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire (2019)
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