Inputs, Incentives, and Self-selection At the Workplace

Francesco Amodio and Miguel Martinez-Carrasco

No 14213, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers’ response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers’ effort, firm profits, and worker participation change differentially along the two margins of input quality and worker type. Firm profits increase differentially from high productivity workers, but absenteeism and quits of these workers also differentially increase. Evidence shows that information asymmetries over inputs between workers and managers shape the response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Input heterogeneity; Incentives; Self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D24 J24 J33 M11 M52 M54 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-hrm and nep-ore
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Working Paper: Inputs, Incentives, and Self-Selection at the Workplace (2019)
Working Paper: Inputs, Incentives, and Self-selection at the Workplace (2019)
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