Monopsony, Markdowns, and Minimum Wages

Ester Faia, Benjamin Lochner and Benjamin Schoefer

No 21058, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper presents the first direct test of two interlinked predictions at the core of the monopsony theory of the labor market: (i) that firms exploit wage-setting power by marking down wages below the marginal revenue product of labor, and (ii) that exogenous wage constraints, if binding, eliminate markdowns. Our research design revisits the 2015 introduction of a high minimum wage in Germany. Drawing on a monopsony model, we derive an empirically tractable difference-in-differences specification that provides a quantitative benchmark for the firm-level markdown response. Our main result is that empirical markdowns respond only 0–25% as much as the monopsony model would have predicted. Hence, at least for the labor market segment we study, (i) markdowns largely reflect other distortions than monopsony, (ii) markdowns are mismeasured, (iii) minimum wages induce widespread labor shortages, or (iv) the standard monopsony model does not provide a full, realistic account of the labor market.

JEL-codes: E0 J0 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21058 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21058

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().