Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation

Jean-Robert Tyran, Steffen Huck and ,

No 6624, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms? reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with different sellers. We find that such information exchange fosters firms' incentives for reputation building and, thus, enhances trust and efficiency in markets. This efficiency-enhancing effect is already achieved with a rather low level of network density.

Keywords: Consumer network; Information conditions; Moral hazard; Reputation; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D40 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Consumer networks and firm reputation: A first experimental investigation (2010)
Working Paper: Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation (2007)
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