Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game

Luigi Zingales, Paola Sapienza and Nicole M. Baran

No 7634, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

Keywords: Donation; Field and lab experiments; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7634 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7634

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7634

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().