Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game

Nicole M. Baran, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales

No 15654, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

JEL-codes: C9 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
Note: EEE IO PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15654.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15654

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15654

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().