Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Jean-Robert Tyran, Ernesto Reuben and Thomas Markussen

No 9099, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Keywords: Public goods; competition; tournament; cooperation; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice (2014)
Working Paper: Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice (2012)
Working Paper: Competition, cooperation, and collective choice (2012)
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