Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 6620, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Keywords: tournament; public goods; competition; cooperation; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Economic Journal, 2014, 124 (574), F163-F195

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp6620.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice (2014)
Working Paper: Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice (2012)
Working Paper: Competition, cooperation, and collective choice (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6620

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