EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

David de la Croix () and Fabio Mariani ()

No 2012005, Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.

Keywords: Marriage; Polygyny; Monogamy; Divorce; Human capital; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
Date: 2012-03-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2012005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2015)
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: From Polygamy to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2012005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().

 
Page updated 2019-07-21
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2012005