From Polygamy to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

David de la Croix

No 49, 2012 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygamy, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). Preferences are aggregated through a voting process. After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygamy to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the share of rich males, or from an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes more than polygamy the upward social mobility of females. These results also show that polygamy is compatible with democracy.

Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
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Related works:
Journal Article: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2015)
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2015)
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2012)
Working Paper: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012)
Working Paper: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012)
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