From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

David de la Croix and Fabio Mariani ()

No 6599, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.

Keywords: political economy; marriage; polygyny; monogamy; divorce; human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published - published in: Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82(2), 565-607

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Related works:
Journal Article: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2015)
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2015)
Working Paper: From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (2012)
Working Paper: From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012)
Working Paper: From Polygamy to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions (2012)
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