Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede

No 722, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of the shareholders.

Keywords: general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D52 D71 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2001-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2005)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2004)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0722

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