Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets

Mich Tvede and Hervé Crès

No 04-09, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting — one share, one vote — and at ?-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ? × 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ?-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if ? = S - J S - J + 1 , where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that ?-majority stable stock market equilibrianeed not exist for smaller ?’s.

Keywords: general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms, voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D52 D71 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2004/0409.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2005)
Working Paper: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2001)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0409

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