Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede
Additional contact information
Mich Tvede: Department of Economics [Copenhagen] - Faculty of Social Sciences [Copenhagen] - UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at p-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most p x 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a p-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that p > (S - J) / (S - J + 1') where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of firms and B is the dimensions of the sets of efficient production plans for firms. Moreover, an example shows that p majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller p's.

Keywords: general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2001

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2005)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2004)
Working Paper: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2001)
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00597193

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().