Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets
Mich Tvede and
Hervé Crès
Additional contact information
Mich Tvede: Department of Economics [Copenhagen] - Faculty of Social Sciences [Copenhagen] - UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a ¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ½ £ 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that ½ ¸ min ½ S ¡ J S ¡ J + 1 ; B B + 1 ¾ where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms and B is the dimensions of the sets of e±cient production plans for ¯rms. Moreover, an example shows that ½-majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller ½'s.
Date: 2001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01064884
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01064884/document (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2005) 
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2004) 
Working Paper: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets (2001) 
Working Paper: Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01064884
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().