Majority vote following a debate

Nicolas Vieille () and Itzhak Gilboa

No 761, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Keywords: Case-based decision theory; voting theory; debates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2002-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority Vote Following a debate (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0761

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