Majority vote following a debate

Nicolas Vieille () and Itzhak Gilboa

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Abstract: Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Keywords: Majority vote; debate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol.23,n°1, pp.115-125. ⟨10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9⟩

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Journal Article: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2002)
Working Paper: Majority Vote Following a debate (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464932

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9

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