Majority Vote Following a debate

Itzhak Gilboa and Nicolas Vieille ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Keywords: Case-based decision theory; voting theory; debates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 2002

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Journal Article: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2002)
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