Majority vote following a debate

Itzhak Gilboa and Nicolas Vieille ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23, issue 1, 115-125

Abstract: Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2004)
Working Paper: Majority vote following a debate (2002)
Working Paper: Majority Vote Following a debate (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9

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