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Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments

Martin Kocher () and Matthias Sutter ()

No 125, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result may depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel decision making protocol opens up the black box of group decision making and allows to track important features of the group interaction process. We are able to show that the mere fact of being a group member shifts initial individual choices towards the game-theoretic equilibrium.

Keywords: gift-exchange experiment; group behavior; individual behavior; decision making; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2007)
Working Paper: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments Downloads
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