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Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments

Martin Kocher and Matthias Sutter

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result may depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel decision making protocol opens up the black box of group decision making and allows to track important features of the group interaction process. We are able to show that the mere fact of being a group member shifts initial individual choices towards the game-theoretic equilibrium.

Keywords: gift-exchange experiment; group behavior; individual behavior; decision making; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2007)
Working Paper: Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2003) Downloads
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