Change and persistence in the German model of collective bargaining and worker representation

John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Alex Bryson and André Pahnke

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper depicts and examines the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany. Using repeat cross-section and longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show the overwhelming importance of behavioral as opposed to compositional change and, for the first time, document workplace transitions into and out of collective agreeements via survival analysis. We provide estimates of the median duration of coverage, and report that the factors generating entry and exit are distinct and symmetric.

Keywords: sectoral and firm agreements; changes in collective bargaining/works council coverage; shift-share analysis; bargaining transitions; survivability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011-11-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/121763/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Change and Persistence in the German Model of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation (2011)
Working Paper: Change and Persistence in the German Model of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:121763

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().