Influence functions, followers and command games

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

No 831, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.

Keywords: New Zealand; influence function; follower function; lower and upper inverses; kernel; com- mand game; command function; minimal sets generating a command game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2008/0831.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
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