Influence functions, followers and command games
Michel Grabisch and
Agnieszka Rusinowska
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 1, 123-138
Abstract:
We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.
Keywords: Influence; function; Follower; function; Lower; and; upper; inverses; Kernel; Command; game; Command; function; Minimal; sets; generating; a; command; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:123-138
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