 Influence functions, followers and command gamesMichel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska Post-Print from HAL Abstract: We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered. Keywords: influence function; follower function; lower and upper inverses; kernel; command game; command function; minimal sets generating a command game (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72 (1), pp.123-138. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003⟩ Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00583867 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.