Influence functions, followers and command games

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered

Keywords: Influence function; follower function; lower and upper inverses; kernel; command game; command function; minimal sets generating a command game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/B08080.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2011)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
Working Paper: Influence functions, followers and command games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:b08080

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().