Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty

Fabio Galeotti, Valeria Maggian and Marie Claire Villeval

No 1924, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Deterrence institutions are widely used in modern societies to discourage rule violations but whether they have an impact beyond their immediate scope of application is usually ignored. Using a natural field experiment, we show that they affect intrinsic honesty across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters in public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections by the transport company. We then measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new unrelated context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increases unethical behavior of fraudsters but also of non-fraudsters.

Keywords: Deterrence Institutions; Intrinsic Honesty; Spillovers; Field Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D02 D91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2019/1924.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2021)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2021)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2019)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1924

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