Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty

Fabio Galeotti, Valeria Maggian and Marie Claire Villeval

The Economic Journal, 2021, vol. 131, issue 638, 2508-2528

Abstract: The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2021)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2020)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2019)
Working Paper: Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty (2019)
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