Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams

Brice Corgnet, Brian Gunia () and Roberto Hernan Gonzalez
Additional contact information
Brian Gunia: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, 100 International Drive Baltimore, MD 21202, USA

No 2006, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.

Keywords: Social Incentives; Social Pressure; Moral Hazard in Teams; Laboratory Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D91 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2020/2006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams (2021)
Working Paper: Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams (2021)
Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2020)
Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2020)
Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2019)
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