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Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams

Brice Corgnet (), Brian Gunia and Roberto Hernan Gonzalez ()
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Brian Gunia: JHU - Johns Hopkins University

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Abstract: We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.

Keywords: Laboratory Experiments; Moral Hazard in Teams; Social Pressure; Social Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02483217
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Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (2019) Downloads
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