Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni and Marie Claire Villeval

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Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation -rather than its benefits- are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: Excuse-driven behavior; Charitable giving; Social preferences; Experiment; Ambiguity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-02548954v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in European Economic Review, 2020, 124, pp.103412. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103412⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving (2019)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02548954

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103412

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