Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni and Marie Claire Villeval

European Economic Review, 2020, vol. 124, issue C

Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation -rather than its benefits- are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Excuse-driven behavior; Charitable giving; Social preferences; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving (2019)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:124:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300441

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103412

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