Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving
Sébastien Massoni () and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
Working Papers from HAL
A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation-rather than its benefits-are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.
Keywords: excuse-driven behavior; Ambiguity; charitable giving; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving (2019)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
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