EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories

David Dickinson and Marie Claire Villeval ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the "crowding-out" literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account (Frey, 1993). Based upon a realtask laboratory experiment, our results show that principals are not trustful enough to refrain from monitoring the agents, and most of the agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring. However we find also some evidence that intrinsic motivation is crowded out when monitoring is above a certain threshold. We identify that both interpersonal principal/agent links and concerns for the distribution of output payoff are important for the emergence of this crowding out effect.

Keywords: principal-agent theory; monitoring; crowding-out; motivation; real effort experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00175010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in IZA Dicussion paper n° 1222. 2004

Downloads: (external link)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00175010/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004)
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-08
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175010