Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories

David Dickinson and Marie Claire Villeval

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Keywords: crowding-out; monitoring; motivation; principal-agent theory; real effort experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in European Association of Labour Economists Conference, Sep 2004, Lisbon, Portugal

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (2008)
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2005)
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004)
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004)
Working Paper: Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00176789

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