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Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Tor Eriksson (), Sabrina Teyssier () and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Sabrina Teyssier: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: tournament; performance pay; incentives; sorting; selection; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00175480
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Published in Economic Science Association, European Meeting, Sep 2006, Nottingham, United Kingdom

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Related works:
Journal Article: SELF-SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006)
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006) Downloads
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