Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Tor Eriksson, Sabrina Teyssier () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Sabrina Teyssier: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: tournament; performance pay; incentives; sorting; selection; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Economic Science Association, European Meeting, Sep 2006, Nottingham, United Kingdom

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Related works:
Journal Article: SELF‐SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS (2009)
Working Paper: Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2009)
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006)
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006)
Working Paper: Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006)
Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175480

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